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Abstract 
Early researches on listed firms proved that both audit firm size (Carey and Simnett, 2006; Francis and Yu, 2009; 
Chen et al.2009; Choi et al., 2010) and auditor industry specialization (Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003; 
Solomon et al. 1999; Monsouri et al., 2009; Gull et al., 2009) have significant influence on audit quality. The 
present research was intended to determine whether audit firm size and auditor industry specialization have 
significant influence on audit quality in Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). This research is critical, since 
there are several case of financial statement manipulation  that have been performed on SOEs since 2001, and in 
2003, 12 auditors have been recommended by BPK (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan - The Supreme Audit of 
Indonesia) to be investigated by PPAJP  (Pusat Pembinaan Akuntan dan Jasa Penilai – The Center for Accountants 
and Apraisers Supervision) due to their role in manipulating SOE’S financial statement, which they were audited 
(Langgeng Subur, Chairman of PPAJP, akuntanonline.com, September 16th, 2013).  The research was conducted 
on 36 SOEs by using 108 financial statements of years 2010-2012.  It found out that both audit firm size and 
auditor industry specialization have insignificant influence on audit quality of SOEs in Indonesia.The findings of  
the present research were inconsistent with the earlier researches conducted on some listed firms (Carey and 
Simnett, 2006; Francis and Yu, 2009; Chen et al. 2009; Choi et al. 2010; Krishnan, 2003; Solomon et al.1999; 
Monsouri et al. 2009; Gull et al. 2009) that had found that both audit firm size and auditor industry specialization 
have significant influence on audit quality. 
Keywords: audit firm size, auditor industry specialization, audit quality 
 
1. Introduction 
Financial statement is a key information in decision making (Ross et al., 2012:12). Therefore, financial statement 
has to capture the real economic condition (Watkins et al., 2004), and doesn’t contain asymmetric information. 
Asymmetric information is an information that give benefit to the party that who controls information and 
disadvantage to another party who has no control on informations (Scott, 2009:13). The objective of  audit is to 
ensure that a financial statement is free of  misstatement, either from error or fraud (GAO in Gramling et al. 
2012:805), and  audit may able to reduce agency costs and informational asymmetry (Almutairi et al. 2009; Chen 
et al. 2005). 
Although financial statement have been audited, there are no guarantee that the statement is free from 
material misstatement, both from error or even fraud. Therefore, auditor will always be blamed when manipulated 
financial statement scandal is revealed, such as in Enron, WordCom, Global Crossing, ImColne Systems, and Tyco 
International (Shafie, et al. 2009). Manipulation of financial statement also occurs in Italy which performed by 
Parmalat in 2000 (Cameran, et al. 2006), in India which performed by Satyam Computer Service, Ltd in 2009, and 
Olympus Corporation in Japan on 2011 which also involving Big 4 (Tunakotta, 2013:436-445, and 501-506). In 
Indonesia, the first financial scandal which was revealed to public was Bank Duta in 1990. After that, lots of 
financial statement manipulation cases have taken place till latest years, involving both listed firms such as Fren 
in 2008 (Kontan.co.id., March 3, 2009) and by non-listed firms. In 2013, BPK give recommendation to PPJP as 
an authority of supervising both public accountants and public accounting firms to investigate 12 auditors because 
their audit reports had found no accounting manipulation by SOEs which they were audited  (Langgeng Subur, 
Chairman of PPAJP, Akuntanonline, September16, 2013). Because financial statement manipulation cases are still 
happening, audit quality becomes a concern for both financial statement users. Auditing firm, professional and 
regulatory bodies are often subject of criticism and face pressures to restore confidence in auditing (Hol, and 
Zaman, 2012). Up untill now, it remains a debatable topic of discussion among stakeholders, regulators, standard 
setters, auditors, and others, and in some researches (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board-
IAASB, 2014). 
Audit quality are commonly researched on listed and  non state-owned enterprises (Francis et al. 2009; 
Balsam et al. 2003; Carrey and Simmett, 2006; Francis and Yu, 2009; Laurence et al. 2011; Asthana and Boone, 
2012).This research was conducted on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) of Republic of Indonesia, which are 
involved 36 SOEs and used 2010-2012 financial statements data. Previous researches on listed firms proved that 
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audit firm size has significant influence on audit quality (Carry and Simnett, 2006; Francis and Yu, 2009; Chen et 
al.2009; Choi et al. 2010). Other variable which have significant influence on audit quality is auditor specialization 
in certain industries (Balsam et al. 2003; Solomon et al. 1999; Monsouri et al. 2009; Gull et al. 2009). The question 
in this research is,do audit firm size and auditor specialization in certain industries have significant influence on 
audit quality of SOEs in Indonesia? This question is critical because, only part of listed Indonesian SOE which 
were audited by Big 4. While the majority of non-listed SOE were audit by non-Big 4. The result of this research 
is not consistent with prior researches which object were listed companies, whereby this research could not found 
significant influence of audit firm size and auditor industry specialiazation on audit quality in SOEs.  
This research made a contribution, that is, it recognized a need to develop other variables besides audit 
firm size and auditor specialization that may enhance audit quality in SOEs, i.e. supervision auditors by BPK, 
because reviewed by BPK has found manipulation on audited financial statement of SEOs. In auditor selection, 
audit committee should develop some criteria to achieve to high quality audit.Another consideration, is that other 
approach could also be used in defining audit quality, not only relying in audit output as commonly approach, 
which is by detecting finding of errors, but also from an audit process approach, which is by how auditors perform 
their audit in compliance with their professional standards, as of audit quality has already defined by GAO 
(Gramling et al. 2012:805), PCAOB (2013) and IAASB (2014). 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis  
2.1 State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) 
Indonesia has 135 SOEs as of  December 31, 2012, which consists of two types: corporation and public firm. This 
distinction was based on their business area, authority, and intervention of government on the firms’ businesses 
activity. SOEs have a critical role in Indonesia’s economic growth. One of the SOEs’ roles in economy is 
producing goods and services  useful for public welfare, by controlling certain strategic activities in the interest of 
the state. SOE State Ministry of  Indonesia data, shows that during five years from 2010 to 2014, total asset of 
SOEs in creased from IDR 2,505 trillion to IDR 4,580 trillion, profit increased from IDR 103 trillion to IDR 154 
trillion, and total work labor absorbed increased from 688,656  to 774,983. Moreover, according to laws, another 
critical role of SOEs are as a source of state income through dividends. Given the huge role of SOEs, the quality 
of financial statement is crucial for SOEs. 
SOEs’ organizational structure is similar to listed firms’. In enhancing the qualities of their financial 
statement and internal control, SOEs have an internal control department and an audit committee with duties of 
monitoring financial statement and audit processes performed by both internal and external auditors. The two 
organizational units should have been capable of securing the qualities of financial statements and audits. However, 
financial statement manipulation cases still often occur as described above. 
 
2.2 Audit Quality  
Audit quality is debatable but difficult to understand (Knechel et al. 2013), because an audit process involves 
implementation of testing procedures that could not be observed by users of the financial statement (DeAngelo, 
1981; Hussainey, 2009). Thus, there are some researcher defined audit quality by an approach of audit results, and 
auditor and audit firm competency. DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as “the market-assessed joint 
probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in client’s accounting systems, and (b) report the 
breach”. The auditor ability to detect any errors is related to the auditor competence, and willingness to report the 
errors is related to the auditor independence (Shafie et al. 2009). 
Lee, Lie and Wang  (1999) in Widiastuty and Febrianto (2011) define audit quality as the probability 
that an auditor will not release an audit report with unqualified opinion for a financial statements that contains any 
material missatement. Titman and Trueman (1986) and Hussainey (2009) define audit quality as the accuracy of 
information an auditor provided for the investors. Palmrose (1988), and Davidson and Neu (1993) define audit 
quality as an auditor capabilities to detect  and eliminate any misstatements and manipulations in a financial 
statements. Moreover, Wallace (1980) in Watkins et al. (2004) suggests that audit quality is determined by the 
auditor competence in reducing noises and biases and in enhancing the fineness of accounting data. 
Watkins et al. (2004) define of audit quality from two viewpoints, namely, auditor reputation and auditor 
monitoring competence on a financial statement. Auditor reputation is an assessment by others, particularly by the 
users of financial statement.  Reputation is measured by the users’ perceptions on the auditor competence and 
independence. Those auditors who are perceived as high in both competence and independence are considered to 
produce trustworthy financial statements. The second meaning of audit quality is from the viewpoint of an auditor 
monitoring competence on financial statements. The monitoring competence is determined by an auditor 
competence and independence, measured by the audited financial statement information quality. Moreover, a 
financial statement information quality is reflected by informations accuracy, or to the extent of which information 
reflects the real condition (Watkin et al., 2004), or ability to eliminate the bias of the information provided (Wallace, 
1980 in Watkins et al., 2004). 
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Since, the definitions of audit quality by Titman and Trueman (1986), Davidson and Neu (1993) and 
Wallace (1980), Watkins et al. (2004), and DeAngelo (1981) emphasize the  ability of auditors in discovering 
errors and biases and reporting them, therefore previous in researches used numerous discretionary accruals or 
abnormal accruals as a proxy of audit quality (Francis et al. 1999; Chen et al. 2004; Nagy, 2005; Cameran et al. 
2008; Ventkataraman et al. 2008; Choi et al., 2010), because discretionary accruals or abnormal accruals were 
perceived as errors in a management designed financial statement. 
Francis (2011) views an audit quality from two approaches. First, from audit failure that occurs because 
the auditor isn’t independent, or with errorneously issuing auditor report with clean-opinion, but not supported 
with sufficient evidences. Second, the relationship between a going-concern auditor report and client’s business 
failure. An audit is considered as failure if the client’s business failure is not preceded by a presentation of a 
modified opinion on the client’s going concern, or, in the other words, the auditor fails to predict the firm failure 
and thus keeps on presenting a clean opinion, otherwise supposed to going concern opinion (Francis, 2011). 
In this research, audit quality is defined as the capability of auditor in discovering and reporting any 
errors in a financial statement. The most common errors made in financial statement is aggresive income or 
discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are accruals that could be manipulated by management and usually 
intended to achieve a desired profitability or income. This is caused by the management has an authority in control 
and creating policies, including those company accounting policies that favor their position as managers. An 
auditor is obligate to disclosed non fair discretionary accruals to prevent misstatement of financial statement.  
 
2.3 Audit Firm Size and Audit Quality  
Firth and Liau Tan (1998) in Wibowo and Rosienta (2009) state that audit quality is often tied to an audit firm 
scale. DeAngelo (1981) maintains that big  audit firms have a superior audit quality, since they already have 
invested in large audit technology and staff training, and thus they are more competent and more accurate in 
detecting the problems related to misstatement and goingconcern assumptions than small audit firms. Titard (1971), 
Hartley and Ross (1972), and Shockley (1981) in Wati and Bambang (2003) mentions two key reasons for why 
big audit firms are more independent that small ones, namely: (1) separation of a department that delivers audit 
services and one that delivers non-audit services and (2) the revenues gained by an accounting firm is influenced 
by not only one client. 
Lee et al. (1993) in Febrianto and Widiastuty (2010) stated that if both auditors and their clients have 
equally relatively small size, then there is a high probability that the income of the auditors relies on the audit fee 
they gain from their clients. Conversely, big audit firms incline to be more independent of their clients, either the 
clients are big or small in size.  
Lennox (1999) suggests that big  audit firms are more capable in detecting signs of financial frauds that 
occur and disclose them in their audit opinion. This is confirmed in a research by Krishnan (2003) that states that 
big audit firms may perceivably reduce questionable accounting practices and report any error the management 
committed. Dong Yu (2007) also stated that big audit firms’ auditors have more experiences with various clients, 
and it gives them with some collective experiences and hence capability of delivering high quality audit. Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986) in Wibowo and Rossieta and (2009) suggest that the bigger the audit firm, the better the 
quality of audit to be produced. Dopunch and Simunic (1982) in Kordelas (2012) stated that investors perceive 
that big audit firms are of higher quality because they have those characteristics that are related to more observable 
audit quality, such as specialized training and peer review, than non-big firms are. Inhoff(1988) in Teoh and Wong 
(1993) surveyed some financial analysts and found differences in their perceptions on the audit quality of big 8 
and non big 8. The big 8 were perceived as having better audit quality than non big 8. Becker et al. (1998) found 
that non big audit firms’ clients reported discretionary accruals with average 1.5% - 2.1% of total asset higher than 
that reported by big audit firms’ clients.  
Dahlan (2009) research in correlation between audit quality, discretionary accruals and auditor 
independence in listed companies at Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in 2000-2002, found that the discretionary 
accruals of companies which have audited by big 5 were smaller than company audited by non-big 5. This finding 
is in accordance with earlier studies (Palmrose, 1988; Borilovicht and Kattelus, 1997), concluding that the audit 
quality of big 5 is higher than that of non big 5. 
Choi et al. (2010) investigated the correlation between audit firm size, audit quality, and audit pricing 
by using a sample of firms in United States of America during of 2000-2005. This research results it was concluded 
that big 4 produced better audit quality and charged higher audit fees on their clients than non-big 4 did. 
Kordelas (2012) investigated earning management and audit quality in public companies in USA listed 
at NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchanges during of 2000-2010. The research findings revealed that audit firm size 
has a negative and significant correlation with discretionary accruals. It indicates that big 4 auditors produced 
lower discretionary accruals than non big 4 did. This finding is consistent with Balsam et al. (2003), Rusmin (2010), 
and Chen et al. (2005), which have concluded that big 4 auditors provide premium quality audit and have better 
competence of restricting earning management practices. Francis and Yu (2009) also found that big 4 produced 
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higher quality audit, and more inclined to issue going-concern opinions, and their clients do not have aggressive 
earning management behaviors. 
Indonesia’s public opinion that big 4 are of higher audit quality than that of non big 4. This is evidently 
show by the audit market share of the big 4 in 2010 that achieved 70% (Republic of Indonesia Ministry of Finance, 
Kompas December 13, 2010), and in 2011 the revenues of big 4 achieved 65.5% of the total revenues of all Audit 
firms in Indonesia (Agus Sutanto, Vice Chairman of PPAJP, akuntanonline.com, June 14, 2013).   
Based on the preceding description, the first hypothesis of research was that audit firm size has influence 
on audit quality, proxied by discretionary accruals. 
H1: Audit firm size has influence on audit quality  
 
2.4 Auditor Industry Specialization and Audit Quality  
Auditors should have knowledge not only in auditing and accounting but also on clients’ industry. Kusharyanti 
(2003) stated  that auditing for manufacturing companies is the same in principle as auditing insurance companies, 
but the nature of business, accounting principles, accounting systems, and prevailing tax rules may be different. It 
requires audit firms to have knowledge on the characteristics of certain industries that affect auditing. Audit firms 
with lots of clients in the same industry (specialization in a given industry) will better recognize any audit risks 
characteristically present in the industry. Therefore, other characteristic of audit firm is that it has auditors with 
audit specialization in a given industry (Craswell et al. 2002).  
Krishnan (2003) points out that a company audited by a specialized auditor will provide a higher 
certainty level, giving some added value to its clients, and is capable of delivering higher quality audit services 
than one audited by non-specialized auditor. 
Some earlier researches confirmed that auditors industry-specialized has influence on audit quality. 
Balsam et al. (2003) investigated the correlation between auditor industry specialization and earning quality, 
finding that auditor specialization decreases discretionary accruals and increases ERC (earnings response 
coefficient). Krishnan (2003) also stated that auditing by an industry specialization auditor produces lower 
discretionary accruals than that by a non industry specialization auditor. Meanwhile, Van, et al. (2006) also found 
that the abnormal accruals of those companies that were audited by auditors with a certain industry specialization 
were lower than ones audited by non-specialized auditors. 
The experiments by Salomon et al. (1999) on partner auditors and senior managers of some audit firms, 
with specific knowledge on finance and health industries, found that both partner auditors and senior managers 
have better knowledge on financial errors in auditing their clients where they have specific knowledge on the 
industry than when they audit their clients of other industry where they do not have specific knowledge on the 
industry. Monsouri, et al. (2009) and Gull et al. (2009) also found that specialized auditors have significant 
influence on the competence of detecting frauds. Carcello and Nagy (2005) also found a negative and significant 
correlation between auditor specialization in certain industries and the frauds committed by their clients (client 
financial fraud). 
Based on the preceding description, the second hypothesis of the research was that auditor specialization 
in a certain industry has influence on audit quality, proxied by discretionary accruals.  
H2: Auditor industry specialization has influence on audit quality  
 
3. Research Method  
3.1 Independent and Dependent Variables 
3.1.1 Independent Variable 
This research in using audit firm size and auditor industry specialist as the independent variable. Audit firm size 
was measured by using nominal scale, 1 for big 4 and 0 for non big 4. Auditor industry specialized was also 
measured by using a nominal scale, 1 for specialized auditor and 0 for non-specialized auditor. In the research, the 
measurement of auditor specialization employed a model that was used by Craswell et al. (2002); Ferguson and 
Stokes (2002); Verleyen and De Beelde (2002), and by Fitriany and Setiawan (2011) as well. The auditor 
specialization was measured by the percentage of clients audited by audit firm in a given industry. Then, weighting 
was carried out on a basis of total asset of a firm by the following formula: 
Specialization =  (total clients of the audit firm in the industry/total emitten in the industry) x (average 
assets of the audit firms’s clients in the industry/average total emitten in the 
industry) 
The basis of the determination of specialization is that if the audit firm controls > 10% market share in 
an industry (Craswell et al., 2002; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Verleyen and De Beele, 2002; in Fitriany and 
Setiawan, 2011). 
 
3.1.2 Dependent variable  
Meanwhile, audit quality as the dependent variable was measured by an estimated discretionary accruals 
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modified Jones’s model (1991). Jones’s model was used because it is the best measurement of discretionary 
accruals (Francis et al. 1999). The equations in the model to compute discretionary accruals are as follows: 
ACCj,t = EARNj,t-CFOj,t       (1) 
and 
ACC/TAjt-1  = β1 (1/TAjt-1) + β2(∆REVj,t-∆RECj,t)/TAjt-1 + β3 (PPEjt/TAjt-1) + Ԑj,t  (2) 
Where: 
ACCj,t =  total accruals of company j in year t 
EARNj,t =  total net income of the current year operation of company j in year t 
CFOj,t =  total cash flow from operation of company j in year t 
REVj,t =  change in the revenues of company j from year t-1 to year t 
RECj,t =  change in the receivables of company j from year t-1 to year t 
PPEj,t =  fixed asset of company j on the end of year t 
Ԑj,t =  errors of company j in year t    
The estimated coefficient of equation (2) was used to compute the estimated accrual of each company, 
assumed as containing no discretionary component. The difference between the estimated accruals and actual 
accruals is the discretionary accruals. 
3.1.3 Control Variables 
The research used client size, debt ratio, and loss suffered by the company as control variables . 
a. Client size was included in the model because it has negative influence on discretionary accruals. According 
to Kordelas (2012), big firms have less incentive to be involved in earning management because their financial 
statements are inspected and analyzed by third party financial specialists. Choi et al. (2010) maintains that the 
larger the company, the less chance they perform earning management. 
b. Debt ratio, describing decreases in a company’s financial condition. Francis & Yu (2009) suggest that those 
companies with more debts use accruals more often in increasing profits, so that it is predicted that their debt 
levels will have a positive correlation with their discretionary accruals. 
c. Loss. Management tends to perform a reported earning management to avoid reporting profit decreases and 
losses. Therefore, deficiency of corporate income reporting by management has influence on the incentive 
received. Financial loss variable is used to control any possible influence of corporate financial performance. 
Francis and Yu (2009) revealed a negative association of net-loss companies and accrual quality, indicating 
lower incentive for discretionary accruals. 
 
3.2 Population and Sample  
The research sample consisted of 36 SOEs from total population of 115 SOEs of the Government of Indonesia 
which were not involved in financial service industry, with a breakdown of sample as shown in table 1. The 
financial statements observed were 108 in total, covering years 2010-2012 from 36 SOEs. 
Table 1 
Sampling Procedure  
Description Number of SOE 
SOEs registered in Ministry of SOE for 2010-2012. 
SOEs involved in financial industry. 
Number of non financial SOEs. 
SOEs that didnot publish their annual financial statements for period of 2010-2012. 
SOEs whose data on research variables to be researched hadnot been available 
completely in their financial statement in 2010-2012. 
SOEs for which there were no data available about it’s auditors. 
Number of SOEs existing in each industry was less than 3. This criterion was used to 
ensure a sufficient data pooling in each estimated industry specialization auditors. 
135 
(20) 
115 
(67) 
 
(6) 
(2) 
(2) 
SOEs selected as sample. 36 
Number of observation: Financial statement period of 2010-2012; 36 SOEs x 3 years. 108 
 
4. Data Analysis Method  
The data was analyzed by using a multivariate analysis to determine the influence of  audit firm size, auditor 
industry specialization on audit quality, and with control variables are client size, debt ratio, and loss. The 
equation of regression used in the research was as follows: 
DACjt = β0 + β1FIRMSIZEjt + β2SPECLSTjt + β3CLNSIZEjt + β4DEBTjt + β5LOSSjt + Ԑ 
 
 
Where: 
β =  coefficient  
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DAC =  discretionary accruals of firm j in year t 
FIRMSIZE =  audit firm size of firm j in year t 
SPECLST =  industry specialization auditor of firm j in year t  
CLNSIZE =  size of firms j in year t 
DEBT =  debt ratio on the asset of firms j in year t 
LOSS =  financial loss of firm j in year t 
Ԑ =  residual error 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Descriptive analysis  
From the descriptive statistic in Table 2 it could be seen that average discretionary accruals was 0.031 and standard 
deviation was 0.077, showing a relative high variation in discretionary accruals management by the firms, because 
the average was less below the standard deviation. 
For the control variable of client size, the descriptive statistic result of Ln asset showed that the value of 
mean was 20.052 and standard deviation 1.4924. It indicated that the data deviation of client size was good because 
the value of mean was below that of standard deviation.  
For the control variable of debt ratio, the descriptive statistic result showed that the value of mean was 
0.523 and standard deviation 0.222. It indicated that the data deviation on debt ratio was relative good. 
The descriptive statistic results in Table 3, the frequency distribution of audit firm size variable of 108 
observations, showed that SOEs were audited more by  non-big 4 that is, 77,8% and 22.8% by big 4. Meanwhile, 
the frequency distribution of auditor industry specialization variable showed that SOEs were audited more by non-
specialization, that is, 63,8%, and the remaining 32.8% by spcialist auditor. And the frequency distribution of  loss 
variable showed that 2.8% SOEs used as sample suffered some losses in time period of 2010-2012, and the 
remaining didn’t. 
 
5.2 Hypothesis Testing 
The result of data processing by a regression analysis was presented in table 4. From the result of the procession 
an equation of regression was obtained as follows: 
DACit = 0.098 – 0.020 FIRMSIZE – 0.018 SPECLST – 0.002 CLNSIZE + 0.012 DEBT + 0.066 LOSS 
5.2.1 Hipothesis 1 (H1) 
The equation of regression above showed that audit firm size  has influence in increasing audit quality by 0.020. 
The testing of first Hypothesis (H1) in table 4 showed that the value of t-count was -0.892 that is less than t-tabel 
1,96. This result shows although audit firm size has influence in decreasing discretionary accruals, however the 
influence was insignificant. Thus, the hypothesis that audit firm size has influence on audit quality proxied by 
discretionary accruals was rejected. 
The research result was inconsistent with the research by Kordelas (2012), Choi et al. (2010), Dahlan 
(2009), and Francis and Yu (2009) which were found that the discretionary accruals was smaller for the firms 
audited by big 4 than that by non-big 4, and the larger size the audit firm, the higher the quality of audit produced. 
However, the research result was in consistent with that of Yasar (2013), Luhgiatno (2010), Watkins et al (2004), 
and Khurana and Raman (2004). However, the finding of he research consistent with Kabir, et al (2011) and Razi 
(2011), which found that association the big 4 with discreationary accruals wasn’t significnce.  
Khurana and Raman (2004) stated that the higher quality of audit by big 4 appeared only in United States 
of America, not in other nations they researched (Australia, Canada, and England). According to them, the 
determinant  factor of the difference was litigation risk for auditors, where litigation risks in USA are relatively 
higher than other contries. Thus, in USA, big 4 pay more attention on the quality of their audit. Therefore, it could 
be concluded that audit firm size are not always to be able to improve audit quality in the countries where the 
litigation risks they are facing is relatively insignificant. 
In addition,  to the small risk of litigation risk in Indonesia, there was other factor that caused audit firm 
did not having significant influence on audit quality in Indonesian SOEs, that is, the sole ownership of SOEs’ by 
the government only. The ownership of  SOEs that is concentrated in the state makes a one-sided control, and thus 
if the control of government is not stringent that there will be no incentive to enhance audit quality. 
5.2.3 Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
The equation of regression for the research data processing revealed that the coefficient of auditor specialization 
was minus 0.018. It meant that auditor specialization in a given industry could improve an audit quality by 0.018. 
The testing of second hypothesis (H2) in table 4 showed the value of t-count of -1.080 and this less than t-table 
1,96. It meant that auditor specialization in certain industry has a negative influence on discretionary accruals, but 
the influence was insignificant. Thus, the hypothesis that industry specialized auditors have significant influence 
on audit quality as proxied by discretionary accruals was rejected.  
Meanwhile, from the testing of control variables are firm size, debt ratio and financial loss showed the 
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same value where their t-count less than 1,96. It means that client size, debt ratio, and loss have not significant 
influence on discretionary accruals. 
The research result was inconsistent with that of Fitriany and Setiawan (2011), Balsam et al. (2003), and 
Krishnan (2003) that found that the firms audited by industry specialized auditors inclined to be prudent in 
reporting discretionary accruals. It meant that industry specialized auditors could detect the earning  management 
practices performed by the firms. A research by Gull et al. (2009) also found that specialized auditors have 
significant influence on discretionary accruals. 
However, this research is consistent with that of Kono and Yuyetta (2013) and Luhgiatno (2010), which 
have found that there was insignificant influence of industry specialized auditors on discretionary accruals. In our 
opinion, the insignificance of  influence of specialized auditor on audit quality probably because the proportion of 
sample of the present research by 63% was audited by unspecialized auditors, and only 37% by specialized auditors, 
and thus its influence on discretionary accruals could not be clearly seen. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Based on the result of testing conducted in the research it was found that both audit firm size variable and auditor 
specialization have negative but insignificant influence on discretionary accruals. It indicated that did not different 
audit quality in SOEs in time period of 2010-2012 between big 4 and auditor specialization with non-big 4 and 
auditor non-specialization. 
Further researches may consider some other independent variables that may influence audit quality, such 
as audit tenure. Audit tenure is interesting matter in Indoensia, because Government Rule No. 20, 2015 stated that 
limitation of audit tenure could be applicated only for auditor (5 years), while audit firms is not limited. This is 
different from prior rule (PMK – Financial Minestry Rule No. 17, 2008) where auditor tenure were limited for 3 
years and and audit firms for 6 years. In Additon audit fee and quality review from accountant regulator should be 
considered to be researched as variabels that could influence audit quality of SOEs. Besides, the defenition of audit 
quality may be used as an audit process approach, as offered by GAO in Gramling et al. (2012:805). Further 
research also may add other control variables that influence audit quality, e.g., Leverage, ROI, corporate health 
level, and good corporate governance. 
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Appendix -1 
Theortical Framework 
 
 
Appendix-2 
Tabel2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
DAC 108 -.13253 .35975 .0316483 .07772033 
Client Size 108 24.76643 33.64430 29.0521179 1.49247682 
Debt ratio 108 .08742 .90105 .5233995 .22288403 
Valid N (listwise) 108     
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Apendix-3 
Tabel3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Proportion 
Dummy = 1 
Proportion 
Dummy = 0 
Audit firm size 22.2% 77.8% 
Auditor Specialist 37,2% 62,8% 
Loss 2.8% 97.2% 
 
Appendix-4 
Tabel 4 
HasilPengujian 
DACit= 0.098 – 0,020 SIZEKAP – 0.018 SPECLST – 0,002 CSIZE  
+  0.012EBTit + 0.066 LOSS 
Variabel Coefficient t-Statistic p value 
(Constant) .098 .531 .007 
Audit firm size -.020 -.892 .374 
Auditor specialist -.018 -1.080 .283 
Client size -.002 -.337 .737 
Debt ratio .012 .728 .154 
Loss .066 1.436 .154 
N 108 
Adjusted R-squared .011 
F-statistic 1.243 
p value (F-statistic) .295 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 .334a .111 .086 .07690949 1.749 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ln_ait, (Revit-Recit), PPE/Ait) 
b. Dependent Variable: TAC/Ait) 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .077 3 .026 4.340 .006b 
Residual .615 104 .006   
Total .692 107    
a. Dependent Variable: TAC/Ait) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), ln_ait, (Revit-Recit), PPE/Ait) 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) .280 .142  1.969 .052   
(Revit-Recit) .006 .029 .019 .209 .835 .996 1.004 
PPE/Ait) -.090 .030 -.276 -2.975 .004 .990 1.010 
ln_ait .009 .005 .162 1.741 .085 .987 1.013 
a. Dependent Variable: TAC/Ait) 
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Appendix-5 
Output of SPSS of Discretionary Accruals 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
DAC 108 -.13253 .35975 .0316483 .07772033 
Client Size 108 24.76643 33.64430 29.0521179 1.49247682 
Debt_ratio 108 .08742 .90105 .5233995 .22288403 
Valid N (listwise) 108     
 
Frequency Table 
Audit Firm Size 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
NON BIG 4 84 77.8 77.8 77.8 
BIG 4 24 22.2 22.2 100.0 
Total 108 100.0 100.0  
 
Auditor specialization 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Non Specialist 68 63.0 63.0 63.0 
Specialist 40 37.0 37.0 100.0 
Total 108 100.0 100.0  
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 .240a .057 .011 .07728273 1.847 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Size, Debt ratio, Loss, audutir specialist, audit firm size 
b. Dependent Variable: DAC 
 
 
 
 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.22, 2015 
 
13 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .037 5 .007 1.243 .295b 
Residual .609 102 .006   
Total .646 107    
a. Dependent Variable: DAC 
b. Predictors: (Constant)Size, Debtratio,Loss, Auditor Specialist, Audit firm size 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) .098 .184  .531 .597   
Audit firm 
size 
-.020 .022 -.108 -.892 .374 .636 1.572 
Auditor 
specialist 
-.018 .017 -.114 -1.080 .283 .833 1.200 
Client size -.002 .006 -.042 -.337 .737 .599 1.669 
Rasio_Debt .012 .036 .036 .348 .728 .882 1.134 
Loss .066 .046 .140 1.436 .154 .974 1.026 
Dependent Variable: DAC 
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